Are U.S. Military Bases a Safeguard or a Target? Gulf Countries' Distrust of the U.S. and the Reorganization of the Middle Eastern Order

As the war involving the United States and Iran drags on, the dissatisfaction among Gulf countries is reaching a stage where it can no longer be dismissed as mere "frustration with an ally." What is spreading across the region is not so much disappointment in the U.S. military might itself, but rather a fundamental distrust of whether the U.S. will truly take responsibility until the post-war period. Over the past year, Gulf countries have tried to avoid the escalation of conflict, but in reality, they have been subjected to Iranian attacks, and the Strait of Hormuz, a vital economic artery, has become nearly dysfunctional. This has led to the question, "Why are those who are supposed to be protected paying the price of being on the front lines?"

According to an article published by InfoMoney based on Bloomberg, doubts about U.S. security guarantees and the Trump administration's strategy are growing privately among government officials in Gulf countries. Saudi Arabia has intercepted multiple drones, and ports in Kuwait have suffered damage. Moreover, the Strait of Hormuz remains under severe constraints, directly impacting the income of oil-producing countries. The presence of U.S. military bases within their borders is increasingly seen as a "risk of becoming a target for retaliation" rather than a deterrent, marking a symbolic change for the Gulf. Previously, these bases were considered insurance. However, as the war drags on, they begin to appear less like insurance policies and more like clearly marked targets.

What complicates the position of Gulf countries is that they are not a monolithic entity. On the surface, each country avoids a decisive confrontation with the U.S., but internally, there is considerable instability. While countries like Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait emphasize early ceasefire, in the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain, there is a strong view that "a ceasefire alone is insufficient, and it is meaningless unless Iran's missile and drone capabilities and control over the strait are diminished." Reuters also reports that the Gulf side is demanding from the U.S. "not just an end to the war, but results that include the degradation of Iran's capabilities." In other words, the dissatisfaction is not entirely anti-American but also a pressure not to end things halfway.

What Gulf countries fear most is a scenario where the U.S. makes a compromise akin to a "victory declaration" at some point, withdrawing without sufficiently diminishing Iran's missile network, proxy forces, and its ability to intimidate the Strait of Hormuz. If that happens, they would be left to face an increasingly angry Iran, having paid only the costs of the war. The article also mentions that Gulf countries are concerned about being "left behind after the U.S. makes a deal with Iran and departs." This is not only a security concern but also a crisis for the national brand of the Gulf ruling class. Their country's reputation for investment, tourism, and financial hubs is based on "regional stability."

The Strait of Hormuz takes on renewed significance here. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, the oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz averaged about 20 million barrels per day in 2024, accounting for about 20% of the world's oil liquid consumption. Reuters also reports that this strait is a strategic chokepoint holding about 20% of the world's oil and gas supply. For Gulf countries, the turmoil in this strait is not a diplomatic issue. It is a "lifeline" issue that connects to national income, finance, currency, defense, and social stability. Therefore, their anger arises from economic realities rather than ideology.

What has further intensified this dissatisfaction is the suspicion of whether "the U.S. is genuinely taking on the pain of the Gulf." The original article states that the Gulf side was irritated by the U.S. temporarily easing sanctions on some Iranian oil stored offshore to curb rising crude oil prices. While they are hindered in exports due to strait insecurity, the U.S. expanded the circulation space for Iranian oil for market stability—if it appears that way, the alliance seems like a unilateral arrangement operated at the convenience of the U.S. rather than an equal protection contract. From the perspective of Gulf countries that have promised massive investments and deepened cooperation with the U.S. in fields like AI and data centers, it is natural to wonder, "What was the return on the security we offered so much for?"

So, are Gulf countries truly moving away from the U.S.? At this point, it is not that simple. Replacing U.S. military power, logistics, intelligence, and arms procurement networks is still not easily found. On the other hand, as the original article points out, discussions are progressing within the Gulf to diversify alliance partners urgently, and the option of deepening relations with China is becoming more realistic. China does not provide clear defense guarantees like the U.S., but there is a view that it can at least offer "predictability." This is not a complete shift in allegiance but more like "buying additional insurance" to reduce the risk of over-dependence on the U.S. The Gulf's approach to China is more about revising insurance design prompted by the war than a shift in values.

Reactions on social media also reflect this complexity. In related threads on Reddit, voices are prominent that see U.S. intervention as having accelerated regional destabilization, with comments such as "Gulf countries became targets as a result of hosting U.S. military bases" and "Once Pandora's box is opened, it is not easily closed." On the other hand, there are also opinions supporting stronger deterrence against Iran, such as "As long as we depend on the Strait of Hormuz, we cannot end the war in a way that allows Iran to use the same threats again" and "It is natural for the Gulf to become more assertive as civilian infrastructure is attacked." In short, social media is filled with feelings of being caught between "not trusting U.S. strategy but also not being able to ignore the threat from Iran," rather than being entirely anti-war or pro-American.

On X, it is notable that attention is focused more on the impact on energy and logistics than on the pros and cons of diplomacy. Former U.S. government official Brett McGurk has been sharing joint statements and international cooperation movements regarding the Strait of Hormuz, while energy analyst John Kemp has argued that the strait's turmoil is causing a global shortage of oil and gas. Thierry Breton also expressed the view that the effective closure of the strait has pushed the U.S.-Iran maritime confrontation into a new phase. What is spreading on social media is not a binary of good and evil, but rather a sense of crisis that "this war is no longer just a Middle Eastern issue but a cost to the entire world through fuel prices and supply chains."

Of course, the voices on social media are not statistically representative public opinion. There is much exaggeration and emotional assertion. Still, the points shared there reflect an undeniable reality. Namely, what Gulf countries are now demanding from the U.S. is not the old-fashioned abstract promise of "protection," but concrete measures on how to protect the strait, how to suppress retaliation, and how to design the post-war order. Trust in security is measured not by the wording of alliance treaties but by what was done during a crisis. This war has once again made that cold principle visible in the Middle East.

In the end, the dissatisfaction of Gulf countries signifies a shift towards a "conditional relationship with the U.S." rather than "anti-Americanism." They cannot completely sever ties with the U.S. However, they can no longer believe unconditionally as before. In between, the Gulf is beginning to increase its options more coldly. More important than whether the Strait of Hormuz reopens is the point that after this war ends, Gulf countries will likely recalculate from scratch "who to entrust their security to." The prolonged war is damaging not only oil transportation but also the very trust in the U.S. as a "reliable protector" that has been built over a long time in the Middle East.

Source URL

1. InfoMoney: Basic information on Gulf countries' dissatisfaction with the U.S., doubts about security guarantees, dysfunction of the Strait of Hormuz, and moves towards China
   https://www.infomoney.com.br/mundo/frustracao-dos-paises-do-golfo-com-os-eua-cresce-a-medida-que-guerra-se-prolonga/
2. Reuters: Additional material on Gulf countries demanding from the U.S. not just a ceasefire but also the degradation of Iran's missile and drone capabilities
   https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/gulf-states-tell-us-ending-war-is-not-enough-irans-capabilities-must-be-degraded-2026-03-27/
3. Reuters: Supplement on UAE's willingness to join an international force to reopen the Strait of Hormuz and the importance of the strait
   https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-willing-join-international-force-reopen-strait-hormuz-ft-reports-2026-03-27/
4. U.S. Energy Information Administration: Reference source for data that the oil passing through the Strait of Hormuz accounts for about 20% of global consumption
   https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504
5. AP: Supplement on the expansion of military tensions in the Gulf region and surrounding areas, U.S. military casualties, and the impact of the strait blockade on the energy market
   https://apnews.com/article/ea713e7850053d8670b062e6b11a6e39
6. Reddit / r/worldnews: Examples of reactions seen on social media, such as "The U.S. opened Pandora's box" and "Gulf countries do not want a half-hearted ceasefire due to dependence on the Strait of Hormuz"
   https://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/1s5p1dy/us_may_deploy_up_to_17000_troops_near_iran_as_war/
   https://www.reddit.com/r/worldnews/comments/1s3lc26/uae_ambassador_to_us_warns_against_ending_iran/
   https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/1rnmbj0/saudi_has_told_iran_not_to_attack_it_warns_of/
   https://www.reddit.com/r/UAE/comments/1s0ixnj/breaking_22032026_iran_issues_stark_warning_to/
7. X Post: For organizing discussion points on social media. Examples of international cooperation regarding the Strait of Hormuz, concerns about global oil and gas shortages, and views that the strait's closure has changed the strategic phase
   https://x.com/brett_mcgurk/status/2035091115607470164
   https://x.com/JKempEnergy/status/2037223771602289023
   https://x.com/ThierryBreton/status/2037924227597099422