China's Missile Production Surges!? 60% Expansion of 136 Facilities — The Reality of the New Cold War

What "Quiet Expansion" Tells Us

On November 7, 2025, Germany's Berliner Zeitung reported, based on a CNN visualization investigation, that China's missile-related facilities have been expanding "quietly but massively" over the past few years. Construction and expansion were observed at over 60% of the 136 targeted facilities, with the total building area increasing by approximately 2 million square meters from early 2020 to the end of 2025—highlighting the clear aspect of "industrial production" where research, testing, and mass production stages run in parallel.Berliner Zeitung

The changes visible from satellites are concrete. A testing site near Beijing has tripled in size. Research and production facilities near Xi'an have each doubled in scale, and new facilities have been confirmed in the surrounding areas. These developments are corroborated by cross-referencing publicly available satellite images and official notifications, expanding not as isolated buildings but as an "ecosystem for production" including roads, warehouses, bunkers, and test ranges.Berliner Zeitung

The Strategic Signal of DF-26

CNN categorizes 99 of the 136 targeted sites as linked not only to research and testing but also to "direct production." A cluster of factories near Beijing has expanded by about 50% over the past five years and is believed to be involved in the manufacturing of the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile. The DF-26 is expected to have dual-use capabilities against land and sea targets, earning the nickname "Guam Killer" due to its range covering U.S. bases in Guam and aircraft carrier strike groups. As the geography of deterrence shifts from "aviation" and "fleets" to "factories" and "inventory," the quantitative potential of this model could influence the military balance in the Pacific.Berliner Zeitung

What Sparked This?—The "Mirror" of the Ukraine War

According to summaries from European media, the background to this enhancement includes lessons learned from the Ukraine war, which exposed the "importance of supply, maintenance, and increased production in a prolonged war of attrition." There are also indications that the construction pace accelerated between 2022 and 2023, suggesting that the redesign of production lines and the establishment of supply networks for materials and propellants likely progressed during "peacetime."n-tv.de　newsukraine.rbc.ua

Has a "New Arms Race" Really Begun?

William Alberque, a Pacific security expert, describes the visualization results as "evidence that China has significantly enhanced regional dominance and deterrence" and "the early stages of a new arms race." This perception, contrasted with the U.S.'s production and procurement delays, is likely to spur policy debates. A mass production system serves as "insurance" for responsiveness and inventory recovery, holding decisive value in both the initial stages of a crisis and subsequent long-term conflicts.Berliner Zeitung

Reactions on Social Media: "Two Anxieties" Over Expansion

Immediately after the announcement, two anxieties intersected on social media. The first is the concern over the production capacity gap between the U.S. and its allies. Posts quoting figures like "expansion at over 60% of the 136 sites" and "21 million square feet (approximately 2 million square meters) of increased floor space" spread, worrying about the outcome of the "inventory war."X (formerly Twitter)

The second is caution against overreach in evaluations. In military subreddits, cautious opinions like "headlines of a 'new Cold War' tend to run wild" and "expansion ≠ immediate capability" are prevalent. From the perspective of distributed deployment and surprise prevention, how to measure "missile production as a capital-intensive industry" becomes a point of discussion.Reddit

Meanwhile, international news accounts and OSINT enthusiasts emphasize "the context readable from satellites," such as the construction of bunkers, tower-like facilities, and test ranges, discussing the "completeness of the supply chain" along with images visualizing the nightscape of factories and the lights of transport routes.X (formerly Twitter)

Implications for Japan: "Resilience" Over Equipment

The implication this time is not merely "improvement in missile performance" but the enhancement of the "ability to continue producing missiles." For Japan, the important points are: ① multilayered protection of bases (dispersion and fortification), ② redundancy of supply bases, ③ constant operability of long-range anti-ship and anti-air networks, and ④ a cycle of procurement and maintenance assuming attrition. Enhancing the "resilience of lines and planes," including supply, repair, and training, rather than the "points" of equipment, will determine the depth of deterrence in sea and air domains.

Counterarguments and Considerations: Limitations of Open Source Evaluation

However, this analysis is based on open sources such as satellite images and public information. Building area and production performance do not necessarily correspond linearly, and factors like quality and bottlenecks (propellants, composites, electronics) are difficult to visualize. The Chinese Ministry of Defense and major state-owned enterprises have refrained from commenting, and the U.S. Department of Defense states it "does not respond to sensitive information." Therefore, while "capacity growth" can be read with high certainty, caution should be exercised in definitively stating "what and how many were produced."Berliner Zeitung

Indicators to Watch

• Increase pace of launchers (TEL) and supply convoys

• Operating frequency of weapon schools and test sites (training frequency)

• Linkage between shipbuilding, aircraft procurement, and "missile inventory"

• Status of hotline development for arms control and crisis management

What satellite photos capture is the "lights of factories," but what those lights illuminate is the totality of industry, logistics, and systems beyond the force. The future of deterrence depends on whether one can first imagine the "opponent's supply chain" rather than the opponent's bases.

Main Reports Referenced (Excerpt)

• Berliner Zeitung "China Significantly Expands Missile Production Capacity" November 7, 2025. Expansion at over 60% of the 136 targeted sites, approximately 2 million square meters of increased floor space, details around Beijing and Xi'an, mention of DF-26.Berliner Zeitung

• n-tv "Factory Expansion Since 2020": Lessons from the Ukraine War and indications of acceleration between 2022 and 2023.n-tv.de

• OOda Loop / Mezha Summary: Evaluation and figures of "historical growth" through cross-referencing satellites, maps, and public notices (21M sq ft ≒ approximately 2 million square meters).OODAloop

• Business Insider (November 2024): Range and operational image of DF-26 (anti-ship, anti-land, nicknamed "Guam Express").Business Insider

• Examples of Social Media Reactions: X (Clash Report, Byron Wan, etc.), Reddit threads (LessCredible/CredibleDefense).X (formerly Twitter)