From TikTok to Telegram: Why the "Radicalization of Minors" in Germany Doesn't Stop

In Germany, the online radicalization of young people has once again emerged as a serious social issue. This was triggered by reports surrounding the 2025 edition of the Constitutional Protection Report, published at the end of June 2026. The original article emphasizes that the number of individuals involved in extremism within Germany has reached an all-time high, with minors particularly coming into contact with extremist ideologies through platforms like TikTok, Instagram, Telegram, and gaming-related services.

The reported figures are alarming. In 2025, there were 85,837 politically motivated crimes recorded in Germany. According to the original article, right-wing crimes accounted for 42,544 of these. The potential number of right-wing extremists is estimated at 58,700, showing a significant increase from the previous year. Numbers related to left-wing extremism and Islamism have also increased or remained high, leading German security authorities to view extremism as a problem that pressures democratic society from multiple directions, not confined to a single ideological sphere.

However, it is important to note that it is not simply a matter of "SNS radicalizing young people." Radicalization progresses through a combination of factors such as family environment, feelings of isolation, lack of belonging at school or in the community, social anxiety, political distrust, experiences of discrimination, and economic stagnation. SNS and messaging apps can serve as "pathways" or "amplifiers" that accelerate this process, but they are not the sole cause. The crux of the problem lies in the structure that draws young people, burdened with anxiety, anger, and a desire for recognition, into online spaces that provide stimulating and simplistic explanations.

TikTok as the Entry Point, Telegram as the Depth

The recent reports particularly highlight the different roles played by popular platforms like TikTok and Instagram and more message-oriented spaces like Telegram.

TikTok, with its short videos, music, editing templates, memes, comments, and live streams, easily converts political and ideological messages into forms of entertainment. For young people, it may not be encountered as a political statement but as amusing videos, provocative remarks, cool presentations, or peer trends. Even if initially approached as a joke, rebellion, or trend-following, continued exposure to similar videos can lead to more of the same content being displayed.

On the other hand, Telegram tends to function as a more closed space. While there are public channels, in groups or limited communities, ideologies can be shared in ways that are less visible from the outside. Experts have long pointed out the structure where young people who become interested through TikTok are guided to Telegram or Discord through profile sections, comments, alternate accounts, or invitation links. The flow is such that popular SNS serves as the "entry point," and closed chat spaces become the "depth."

This structure is not limited to right-wing extremism. Various ideological spheres, such as Islamism, conspiracy theories, anti-Semitism, radical anti-state ideologies, and violent left-wing extremism, create their own subcultures online. In these spaces, words that clearly divide enemies and allies, narratives that stimulate victimhood, posts that glorify violence, and expressions that praise martyrs or past attackers can function as "codes" for young people to join in.

What Do the Numbers Indicate?

The figure of 85,837 politically motivated crimes is a clear warning to German society. However, when interpreting this number, it is important to be aware of differences in statistical categories. The classification of "politically motivated crimes" in police statistics does not necessarily align with the "extremism" classification handled by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. Additionally, classifications such as right-wing, left-wing, religious extremism, and foreign ideology-related can change depending on the background of the incident and the progress of investigations.

Nevertheless, what multiple official sources and reports consistently indicate is the broadening base of extremism and the notable contact with younger age groups. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution explains that in recent years, young, sometimes underage individuals have been identified online displaying strong tendencies towards violence. They are not necessarily affiliated with traditional organizations. Rather, the concern is with cases where individuals are ideologically influenced through memes, videos, chat groups, and gaming communities online before joining existing parties, groups, or street organizations.

This highlights the difficulty of traditional security measures. In the past, it was possible to some extent to monitor and analyze by tracking extremist organizations, gatherings, publications, clear leaders, and memberships. However, now there is a mix of anonymous accounts, groups that disappear in a short time, encrypted communications, cross-platform guidance, and posts where the boundary between jokes and seriousness is blurred. Young people themselves may not initially recognize that they are entering extremist ideologies.

SNS Reactions: Calls for Protection and Caution Against Regulation

Reactions on SNS regarding this issue are broadly divided into three categories.

First, there is the call to "strengthen regulations and age restrictions on platforms to protect minors." Concerns are raised about TikTok and Instagram's recommendation displays, infinite scrolling, designs that make extreme videos more attention-grabbing, and guidance to closed groups. Among parents and educators, there is a prominent argument that "it cannot be managed by families alone" and that "platform companies should standardize safety designs for minors."

Second, there is the reaction that "blanket bans and increased surveillance are dangerous." There is concern that, under the guise of countering radicalization, the government might excessively monitor communications or crack down on politically inconvenient opinions. Particularly in Germany, there is a strong historical caution against state surveillance and thought control. On SNS, there are opinions that "protecting children" and "narrowing freedom of expression" should be considered separately.

Third, there is the voice that "education and creating places of belonging are more important than bans." The background to young people being drawn to extremist ideologies includes loneliness, a desire for recognition, maladaptation at school or home, and anxiety about the future. Simply deleting online posts does not solve the fundamental problem. Rather, it is argued that a combination of trustworthy adults, consultable schools, local places of belonging, media literacy education, anti-discrimination education, and psychological support is necessary.

All these reactions have valid points. It is unrealistic to shift the burden solely onto families and schools without questioning the responsibility of platform companies. On the other hand, the idea that radicalization can be stopped by surveillance and deletion alone is too simplistic. What is needed is to reduce contact with dangerous content while understanding why young people find that content appealing and offering alternative choices early on.

How to View Credibility

The credibility of the original article aligns with public materials and major media reports regarding the main figures and issues it addresses. In particular, the increase in politically motivated crimes, the rise in the number of right-wing extremists, the online radicalization of younger age groups, and the caution towards TikTok, Instagram, Telegram, and gaming-related services are consistent with explanations from the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and related agencies.

However, there are points in the original article that require attention. Firstly, multiple themes are connected within a single article. It covers topics such as extremism, youth SNS usage, smartphone restrictions in schools, preventive education, and even drug policy, which may appear scattered to some readers. While both discussions on youth radicalization and drug policy share the commonality of "prohibition alone is insufficient," they should be examined separately as policy areas.

Additionally, if the impression that "SNS creates radicalization" becomes too strong, there is a risk of oversimplifying causal relationships. While research points out that algorithms tend to spread divisive and emotional content, the reasons individual young people radicalize are not singular. Family, school, community, social exclusion, personal psychological state, and offline human relationships also play significant roles. Therefore, when reading the original article, it is appropriate to perceive "SNS as not the sole cause, but an environment that accelerates, connects, and visualizes radicalization."

Do Algorithms "Create" Radical Ideologies?

The important point is that algorithms themselves do not create ideologies. Algorithms learn the content that users watch for longer, react to, share, and comment on, making it easier to present similar content. The problem lies in the fact that content that stimulates anger, anxiety, hostility, fear, and a sense of superiority strongly attracts human attention.

In political short videos, it is necessary to explain complex social issues in seconds to tens of seconds. Therefore, content that clearly identifies enemies, simplifies causes, and strongly stirs emotions tends to thrive. This is common not only to extremists but also to regular political publicity and influencer culture. However, extremists exploit this structure. They gradually intensify ideological messages by avoiding direct discriminatory language or expressions of violence and using trendy soundtracks, memes, historical references, a sense of sports-like solidarity, fashion, bodybuilding, and traditional values as entry points.

In this process, illegal content does not necessarily appear from the start. That is why there are limits to automatic detection by platforms. While overt hate and incitement to violence can be deleted, ambiguous coded expressions, sarcasm, insider signals, and meanings embedded in images or audio are easily overlooked. Extremists avoid deletion by changing words, using emojis, creating alternate accounts, and guiding users to more closed spaces.

Places "Prohibition" Cannot Reach

In Germany, there is a growing call for age restrictions and limitations on smartphone use in schools regarding the SNS usage of children and young people. In Bavaria, restrictions on private smartphone use in schools and the introduction of educational programs related to chats and SNS are being promoted. Expert committees are also discussing restrictions on SNS use for those under 13, phased protection for ages 13 to 18, and regulations on algorithmic feeds and designs that encourage dependency.

However, there are also limits to prohibition. Young people can fake their age. They may move to services that are harder to monitor in place of banned platforms. Additionally, blocking everything would also eliminate opportunities to learn media literacy. Instead of treating online risks as separate from reality, it is necessary to learn in schools and homes "which information to trust," "who is disseminating it for what purpose," and "how to distance oneself from posts that incite anger."

In this regard, the role of preventive education is significant. What young people need is not simply to be told, "Don't watch because it's dangerous." They need the ability to think about why they were attracted to a post, which emotions were stimulated, and whether they are gaining a sense of security by making someone an enemy. This is not something that can be acquired in a single lesson but requires continuous dialogue and training.

The Responsibility of Platform Companies

TikTok explains in its transparency report based on the EU Digital Services Act that it deletes a large amount of violating content and utilizes automated moderation. Telegram also states in its explanation for the EU that it targets the promotion of violence in public spaces and content related to terrorism for restriction. While these efforts are important, whether they are sufficient is another matter.

Platform companies need to enhance transparency that allows external researchers to verify not only the number of deletions and detection rates but also how minors come into contact with dangerous content, the extent of reposting or re-accounting after deletion, and more. Especially on short video platforms like TikTok, what is "recommended" becomes the core of the user experience. It is only natural that public accountability is demanded there.

At the same time, on services like Telegram, the boundary between public channels and private conversations becomes an issue. While swift action is necessary against incitement to terrorism or clear calls for violence, the protection of private communications is also essential for a democratic society. Countering radicalization constantly questions the balance between security and freedom.

What Should Be Done

The most realistic approach is not to rely on a single solution. First, illegal incitement to violence, glorification of terrorism, concrete attack plans, and discriminatory threats need to be addressed swiftly through collaboration between the police, judiciary, and platforms.

Second, a review of platform design is necessary. For minors, mechanisms are needed to limit infinite scrolling, autoplay, continuous recommendation of extreme content, contact from unknown parties, and guidance to violent or discriminatory content.

Third, school education and family support should be strengthened. Media literacy is not just a technique to spot fake news. It is education to understand how one's emotions are manipulated and how anger and anxiety are transformed into political messages.

Fourth, increasing places of belonging for young people is important. Extremist communities do not attract people solely with ideology. They offer a sense of camaraderie, recognition, roles, adventure, and strength. If there are few healthy communities, dangerous ones may appear attractive. Sports, cultural activities, community activities, consultation support, and safe online participation spaces are also countermeasures against radicalization.

Conclusion: The Problem Is Not the "App," But the Void Surrounding Young People

TikTok and Telegram are important platforms when discussing the radicalization of young people. However, confining the problem to just app names leads to misguided countermeasures. Extremists exploit young people's loneliness, anxiety, anger, desire for recognition, and distrust of society. SNS finds, amplifies, and connects people with the same emotions.

Therefore, what is needed is not a binary choice between "deletion or neglect" or "prohibition or freedom." It is about reducing dangerous content, holding platform companies accountable, delivering practical support to schools and families, and creating a social environment where young people do not feel isolated.

The warning indicated by Germany's Constitutional Protection Report is not irrelevant to Japan either. Short videos, anonymous accounts, closed chats, gaming communities, conspiracy theories, and anti-social memes cross borders. Young people come into contact with extremist ideologies not in special places but within the smartphones they use daily.

Unless adults understand what is happening on the other side of the screen, they cannot protect young people. Fear-mongering alone is not enough. Strengthening surveillance alone is not enough. What is needed is a persistent mechanism that faces the reality of young people and balances freedom and safety, participation and protection.

Source URL

Article conveying an overview of online radicalization of young people in Germany, TikTok and Telegram, and the 2025 edition of the Constitutional Protection Report
https://www.ad-hoc-news.de/wissenschaft/radikalisierung-von-jugendlichen-tiktok-und-telegram-als-kanaele/69663978

Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution: Background explanation on right-wing radicalization, including young people and minors, TikTok, Instagram, chat groups, gaming-related spaces
https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/SharedDocs/hintergruende/DE/rechtsextremismus/radikalisierung-junter-akteure.html

Tagesschau: Major report on the 2025 edition of the Constitutional Protection Report. Overview of right-wing extremist numbers, youth radicalization, left-wing extremism
https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/verfassungsschutz-bericht-extremismus-100.html

BKA: Confirmation of politically motivated crimes, PMK statistics
https://www.bka.de/DE/UnsereAufgaben/Deliktsbereiche/PMK/PMKZahlen/PMKZahlen_node.html

Federal Network Agency: Public materials on online terrorism-related content deletion orders and transparency reports for 2025
https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN