Does Japan Become Anxious as the US and China Grow Closer? Xi Jinping's Diplomacy on "Taiwan and History"

What Japan Should Observe in Smiling Talks

The leaders of the United States and China shake hands and speak of mutual respect. The sight of these two great powers trying to avoid conflict should be welcomed.

However, from Japan's perspective, there are moments that cannot be received with mere relief. If the stability of U.S.-China relations is discussed in connection with pressure on Taiwan or distrust towards Japan, it concerns our security.

An analysis article published by The New York Times on September 26 reads an intention behind President Xi Jinping's friendly behavior to draw President Trump's view of Asia closer to China's side.

According to the article excerpt, Xi worked to restrain U.S. support for Taiwan while bringing up the history of war concerning Japan. It emphasized that the U.S. and China once fought on the same side and attempted to portray Japan, a current U.S. ally, as a potential military threat again, according to the paper's analysis.

What needs to be distinguished here is the report that China made such efforts and the fact that the U.S. accepted those claims. The former alone does not prove the latter.

What Japan should observe is not just the expressions of the leaders. It is which policies are implemented and which promises are maintained after the talks.

Talks Not Limited to "No Achievements"

The NYT article excerpt pointed out that while touching on the extension of the trade war truce, there was no significant breakthrough at the core of the conflict.

Meanwhile, U.S. government public materials noted the operation of a trade and investment consultation framework, agreement on recommending tariff preferences for non-sensitive items worth $30 billion each, and dialogue and accident communication mechanisms related to AI. It should not be read as tariffs being comprehensively reduced on the spot, but it wasn't entirely devoid of practical achievements.

In other words, both evaluations can coexist. While advancing cooperation in economics and crisis management, fundamental security conflicts may remain.

For Japanese companies, increased predictability in U.S.-China relations is meaningful. A sudden escalation of conflict could lead to a review of procurement sources and investment plans. The continuation of dialogue itself should not be considered a loss for Japan.

The issue is what the stability is based on. Is it stability gained by weakening involvement with Taiwan and allies, or is it stability by managing conflicts while maintaining traditional positions? This difference is significant.

Do Not Confuse "Demands" and "Agreements" Regarding Taiwan

According to the Chinese Foreign Ministry's announcement of the talks, Xi asked the U.S. side to oppose "Taiwan independence" and to handle the Taiwan issue cautiously.

However, this is a Chinese demand announced by the Chinese side, and it cannot be concluded that the U.S. Taiwan policy has changed based on that alone. Statements from summit meetings include not only promises obtained from the other side but also claims conveyed by one's own country.

Japanese readers should be careful not to reduce diplomatic expressions concerning Taiwan to a simple approval or disapproval.

For example, in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué, Japan's "recognition" of the government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China and its "full understanding and respect" for the Chinese government's position on Taiwan are written in different terms. Omitting this difference can easily lead to misunderstandings of Japan's position itself.

This time as well, it is necessary to read based on documents and actions what was demanded, what was agreed upon, and what positions have not changed.

Taiwan is not merely a subject for explaining U.S.-China negotiations. There are issues of the safety of the people living there and how they choose their future. Even when discussing from Japan's interests, the will of the Taiwanese people should not be overlooked.

Why "World War II" is Brought Up

References to history are not limited to confirming past events. They also serve as diplomatic means to convey how one wants the current counterpart to be understood.

The efforts by Xi depicted in the NYT article relate to this point. By placing the U.S. and China as "sides that once fought together" and encouraging caution towards Japan, it invites consideration of Asia from a framework different from the current alliance relationships.

Facing Japan's aggression and war damage is necessary. At the same time, the process of post-war reconciliation between Japan and the U.S. and rebuilding their relationship is also indispensable for understanding the current regional order.

According to Jiji Press, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi emphasized the post-war reconciliation and strong trust relationship between Japan and the U.S. while avoiding comments on individual statements between the U.S. and China.

The U.S. government's meeting materials also mention wartime U.S.-China cooperation alongside explanations that the post-war forward deployment of U.S. forces has supported a free and open Indo-Pacific.

Therefore, it cannot be said that "Japan was abandoned because the U.S. and China talked about the history of war." However, there is reason to be cautious about Japan's current image being discussed solely based on past enemies and allies.

Japanese diplomacy requires both a responsible stance towards history and efforts to concretely explain current policies.

Chinese Dominance Theory and Cautious Views Intersect on SNS

Reactions to the talks are not uniform. On the English-speaking SNS and Reddit's "r/geopolitics," posts evaluating that China maintained the upper hand in negotiations were observed.

One post interpreted that by postponing major negotiations, China could respond after observing the political situation in the U.S. following the midterm elections. The lack of prominent agreements itself is seen as a development favorable to China.

On the other hand, comments suggested that it is too early to make evaluations and that future policies, such as the approval of arms sales to Taiwan, need to be observed. Another comment pointed out that strong assertions by leaders also have an aspect of domestic performance.

These are interpretations by the posters, and the details of the negotiations have not been confirmed. Moreover, the reaction of one English-speaking community cannot be treated as the overall public opinion of Japan, Taiwan, or the U.S.

Nevertheless, the way discussions are divided is suggestive. Some read power dynamics from the leaders' behavior and meeting schedules, while others try to judge based on subsequent policies.

In Japan as well, rather than deciding winners and losers based solely on immediate impressions after the talks, it would be more beneficial to follow which interpretations are supported by actual policies.

Three Points of Confirmation for Japan

If considering this meeting as an issue for Japan, the points of confirmation can be organized into three.

First, whether words and actions regarding the alliance are consistent.

On September 21, just before the meeting, the foreign ministers of Japan, the U.S., and South Korea reaffirmed the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. It is premature to judge that such diplomatic accumulations have disappeared just by looking at the friendly performance of the U.S.-China summit.

In the future, it is necessary to continue observing consultations with allies, joint training, and specific security responses.

Second, what kind of relationship arises between economic cooperation and security.

Even if economic negotiation progress and Taiwan-related decisions occur around the same time, it cannot be proven that they were exchange conditions. However, if there is not enough explanation for decisions affecting Japan, distrust will grow. The Japanese government needs to ensure continuous information sharing, not just rely on the relationship between leaders.

Third, whether the lives of people in the region are reflected in diplomatic discussions.

If tensions around Taiwan rise, issues such as the impact on logistics and business activities in Japan and ensuring the safety of residents could arise. The specific impact varies depending on the situation, but merely commenting on the leaders' statements does not prepare for it.

Seeking continued dialogue and preparing for turmoil can coexist. It is necessary to explain what is being prepared to protect in each field of diplomacy, economy, and life.

Japan Needs More Than Just Fear of U.S.-China Rapprochement

What is desirable for Japan is not the continued confrontation between the U.S. and China. The reduction of collision risks and the improvement of economic prospects also benefit Japan.

On the other hand, the safety and will of surrounding countries and regions should not be lightly treated for the sake of improving relations between major powers.

Therefore, while welcoming U.S.-China dialogue, Japan needs to demand necessary explanations as an ally and continue communication with China. Supporting regional stability cannot be sufficiently achieved by focusing on only one side.

What this meeting questions is not just who was more skillful between Trump and Xi. It is how much the safety and will of people living in Japan and Taiwan are included in the "stability" they speak of.

We should observe the policies that follow the handshake photos from this perspective.

Sources and Reference URLs

1. The New York Times (September 26, 2026)
   An analysis suggesting Xi Jinping's efforts regarding Taiwan, Japan, and Asian security towards Trump.
   https://www.nytimes.com/2026/09/26/world/asia/summit-xi-trump-taiwan-japan.html

2. Chinese Foreign Ministry (September 25, 2026)
   Chinese announcement regarding the U.S.-China summit on September 24. Confirmation of Xi's remarks requesting cautious handling of Taiwan. Not independent evidence of the other country's agreement.
   https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng./xw/zyxw/202609/t20260925_12031181.html

3. White House (September 25, 2026)
   U.S. government fact sheet on the outcomes of the visit. Confirmation of descriptions regarding trade and investment, AI-related dialogue, wartime U.S.-China cooperation, and the regional role of U.S. forces post-war.
   https://www.whitehouse.gov/fact-sheets/2026/09/fact-sheet-president-donald-j-trump-advances-a-fair-and-reciprocal-relationship-with-china-while-hosting-historic-state-visit/

4. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Japan-U.S.-ROK Foreign Ministers' Meeting" (September 21, 2026)
   Official document showing pre-summit coordination and reaffirmation of the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
   https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/fp/unp/pageit_000001_03205.html

5. Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs "Joint Communiqué of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People's Republic of China" (1972)
   Original text for distinguishing between the recognition of the Chinese government and expressions regarding Taiwan.
   https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/china/nc_seimei.html

6. Jiji Press/Nippon.com (September 26, 2026)
   Article reporting on the Japanese government's reception of references to wartime U.S.-China relations and Prime Minister Takaichi's remarks on post-war Japan-U.S. relations.
   https://www.nippon.com/en/news/yjj2026092501015/

7. Reddit "r/geopolitics" Thread Related to the Meeting
   Reference to posts evaluating China's negotiating position and comments suggesting future policies, such as arms sales to Taiwan, should be observed. Individual opinions on SNS, not used as fact recognition or representative public opinion surveys.
   https://www.reddit.com/r/geopolitics/comments/1wqh8vk/trumpxi_summit_ends_with_tea_and_tour_but_little/