The "Who Will Protect the Skies" Challenge Posed by Explosive Drones

A small drone is about to significantly alter the debate over European security.

The incident began with a drone discovered at Leipzig/Halle Airport in eastern Germany.

According to the German Federal Prosecutor's Office, the drone was equipped with professional explosives and a detonator, suggesting it was intended to cause an explosion. The site is not just any regional airport; Leipzig/Halle Airport is one of Europe's major cargo hubs, used by logistics companies like DHL and serving as a critical point for NATO's eastern transport operations. Large transport aircraft related to Ukraine also come and go.

Even more shocking is the person who first stopped the drone.

Reports indicate that an airport bus driver, upon spotting the low-flying drone, kicked it down with his foot, causing it to fall to the ground. While the Interior Minister of Saxony praised the driver's courage, he emphasized that this was not an action to be emulated, given the extreme danger posed by the explosives attached to the drone.

However, this episode is symbolic in another sense.

It highlights the fact that a drone carrying explosives infiltrated a critical national logistics hub, and the first person to stop it was not the police, the military, or a state-of-the-art interception system, but an airport employee who happened to be there.

This has rapidly raised a question in Germany:

"Should private companies operating airports, power plants, communication facilities, etc., be given the authority to eliminate dangerous drones, rather than waiting for the police to arrive?"

This is the debate.

51% of Germans Support "Shooting Rights for Civilians"

A survey conducted by Forsa on behalf of the German magazine stern and RTL on August 6-7, involving 1,005 participants, found that 51% supported granting private operators of critical infrastructure the authority to shoot down suspicious drones.

44% opposed, and 5% were unsure.

While a majority, it is not an overwhelming support. It is more indicative of a society divided almost in half on the issue.

By political party, 55% of CDU/CSU supporters and 58% of AfD supporters were in favor. In contrast, 54% of SPD supporters and 66% of Left Party supporters opposed. Among Green Party supporters, 50% were in favor and 43% against, showing that the debate has spread even to groups traditionally cautious about expanding security powers to civilians.

The key point is that this is not a simple matter of "shooting down drones because they are scary."

The issue at hand is how much of the coercive power, traditionally monopolized by the state, should be transferred to private companies.

Germany Has Already Strengthened Its Drone Countermeasures Significantly

The German government has not been idle.

Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, illegal drone flights around airports, military facilities, and energy facilities have increased in Germany, prompting the government to gradually strengthen its countermeasures.

In March 2026, an amended Aviation Security Act will come into effect, allowing the military to assist in drone countermeasures as administrative support when police alone cannot handle the situation, with provisions for using weapons as a last resort.

The Federal Police have also established a dedicated drone countermeasure unit, enhancing detection, tracking, and elimination capabilities. The German government has set up a drone defense center for joint federal and state information handling, advancing nationwide low-altitude airspace monitoring.

However, during this period of institutional development, a drone with explosives infiltrated a critical airport.

Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt has acknowledged that Germany is a target of "daily hybrid warfare," including espionage, sabotage, and cyberattacks from abroad. There are also reports within the government of moves to further expand specialized personnel for drone countermeasures.

The perpetrator's identity requires careful consideration.

Some Western reports suggest intelligence agencies suspect Russian involvement, but German investigative authorities have not officially identified any suspects immediately after the incident. The Russian side also denies involvement. Therefore, it is appropriate to understand the situation as a serious act of sabotage, including potential state involvement, rather than definitively labeling it as a "Russian attack" at this point.

"How Long Will the Government Just Issue Warnings?" on Social Media

The incident has sparked rapid discussions on platforms like Reddit and X.

Notably, there are voices criticizing the German government and NATO's response as "too passive."

On German-speaking Reddit, opinions suggest that this was an attack on a military target using military means, and sarcastic posts argue that merely condemning the incident with strong words is not a deterrent. In English-speaking aviation communities, there are reactions calling for more effective responses, stating that issuing statements after each incident is insufficient.

However, it's not all about hardline stances.

There are counterarguments suggesting that discussing retaliation without confirming the perpetrator is dangerous, and that escalation leading to World War III should be avoided. Some posts also question the theory of Russian involvement.

This division reflects the complexities faced by European society today.

If the response is weak, the other side may conclude that they can act without retaliation.

However, a misstep in response could rapidly escalate tensions between nations, all triggered by a single unidentified drone.

Drones are weapons that can intentionally blur the line between "attack," "crime," "espionage," or "just illegal flying."

"Shooting Down Isn't the Solution"

Another technical debate is also active on social media.

Small drones are inherently difficult to detect with radar compared to large aircraft or missiles. They can fly at low altitudes and blend in with buildings and terrain.

For users questioning whether the drone flew all the way from Russia to Germany, there are suggestions that the drone could have been transported close to the target, assembled, and launched locally, eliminating the need for long-distance flight across borders.

This is also a crucial point for Japan.

When we hear "drone attack," we might imagine a scenario where a large number of unmanned aircraft arrive from overseas, but that's not necessarily the case.

It's theoretically possible to bring commercial parts or small aircraft into the country and launch them from within a few kilometers of critical facilities.

In other words, border defense alone cannot prevent this.

Airports, power plants, substations, oil depots, data centers, port facilities, etc., each facility needs the capability to monitor the "low-altitude sky."

The Biggest Problem with Allowing Civilians to Shoot Down Drones

So, should airport and power companies be able to shoot down drones independently?

The issue is not that simple.

The biggest challenge is the need to determine "friend or foe" within seconds.

Around airports, there may be drones operated for legitimate reasons by police, fire departments, surveyors, inspectors, and the media.

It could be a general aircraft that veered off course due to communication issues.

It's not always possible to determine just by looking at the aircraft whether it carries explosives.

Introducing a system where "civilian security personnel can shoot down drones if they deem them dangerous" will inevitably lead to misidentification issues.

Furthermore, physically destroying a drone does not necessarily eliminate the danger.

If shot down in a populated area or airport, the drone itself will fall. If it carries explosives, it may explode at the crash site.

Using firearms also raises the issue of stray bullets.

Online communities discussing drone defense also highlight the challenges of using firearms and the dangers of falling debris in populated areas.

Therefore, in modern drone countermeasures, "shooting" is not the only form of interception.

It requires combining multiple methods, such as jamming radio waves and navigation, capturing with nets, or using interception drones, depending on the situation.

Most importantly, the "detection, identification, and decision-making" phase before actual neutralization devices is crucial.

If it can't be found, it can't be intercepted.

Even if found, if its identity can't be confirmed, no decision can be made.

Even if a decision is made, if it takes too long to contact the police or obtain permission, it may be too late.

The debate in Germany is precisely about whether private entities should be given authority to shorten this final "decision-making time."

Japan Has Already Strengthened Regulations

For Japan, this issue is not just a distant European matter.

Triggered by incidents like the 2015 drone landing at the Prime Minister's Office, Japan has established regulations, including the "Act on Prohibition of Flight of Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicles," which restricts flights around important facilities such as the National Diet, the Prime Minister's Office, defense facilities, nuclear facilities, and designated airports.

Furthermore, an amended law will take effect on July 14, 2026, expanding the no-fly zones around important facilities to approximately 1,000 meters.

Under the Aviation Law, flying unmanned aerial vehicles is generally prohibited in airspace around airports, requiring coordination with airport managers and control agencies.

Interestingly, Japan already has a system to physically remove illegal drones.

According to the National Police Agency, police officers can order illegal drones to leave and, in certain cases, take necessary measures such as "disrupting flight" or "damaging equipment."

It is also institutionally possible to order measures to be taken by facility managers and other related parties.

However, this is not the same as the "authority for private operators to shoot down drones at their discretion" being discussed in Germany.

Japan's current system is primarily centered around public agencies like the police, not granting comprehensive and independent interception authority to facility operators.

This marks an important difference from Germany.

In Japan, the Command Chain May Be More of an Issue Than "Shooting Rights"

What Japan should learn from Germany's debate is not the conclusion that "civilians should be armed."

More importantly, within the seconds or minutes after a dangerous drone is detected,

who will detect it?

Who will determine its hostility?

Who will contact the police or Self-Defense Forces?

Who will authorize interference?

At what stage can the facility side take action?

These command chains should be decided before an incident occurs.

Especially in Japan, where airports, ports, power plants, logistics centers, and communication facilities are concentrated near major metropolitan areas.

Considering Tokyo Bay, Osaka Bay, and Ise Bay, indiscriminately shooting down a single drone could lead to another major accident.

In that sense, what Japan needs is not a binary choice of "can or cannot shoot down," but a phased defense.

First, constantly monitor low-altitude airspace.

Next, quickly distinguish between legitimate drones and suspicious ones.

Then transition to warning, interference, capture, and ultimately physical neutralization according to the level of threat.

In addition, clearly define the division of authority between private operators like airport and power companies and the police and Self-Defense Forces.

Such a system is more realistic for Japan's social environment.

Drones Have Become the "Affordable Air Force"

One of the biggest military changes demonstrated by the Ukraine war is that the ability to attack from the air is no longer exclusive to states.

In the past, conducting an air attack required fighter jets, bombers, missiles, and a massive military organization to operate them.

That's no longer the case.

Even relatively small aircraft can be used for reconnaissance, surveillance, jamming, and sabotage.

And for the defense side, the costs can be significantly higher than for the attackers.

It's impossible to place expensive air defense systems at every one of the hundreds or thousands of critical facilities.

This asymmetry is precisely why drones are suited for terrorism and hybrid warfare.

That's why the 51% figure in Germany is significant.

It's not just a public opinion poll; it indicates a growing recognition among citizens that the traditional police-centered security system may not be able to handle new threats.

Will the Principle of "Only the State Uses Force" Change?

On the other hand, it's dangerous to assume that the transfer of authority to civilians is an inevitable trend just by looking at the 51% figure.

The fact that 44% oppose is equally important.

The idea that the state monopolizes force and coercion is one of the fundamental principles of a modern state.

Creating exceptions for "critical infrastructure defense" could lead to a slippery slope where the scope expands to data centers, large factories, event venues, and large commercial facilities.

Which facilities should be allowed to "eliminate aerial threats on their own"?

Who will be the operators?